| RISK
AND UNCERTAINTY |
ANNEX |
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INTRODUCTION |
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This
annex provides further guidance in each of the following areas:
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Risk
management; |
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Transferring
risk; |
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Optimism
bias; |
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Monte
Carlo analysis; |
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Irreversibility;
and |
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The
cost of variability in outcomes. |
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RISK MANAGEMENT
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Risk
management is a structured approach to identifying, assessing and
controlling risks that emerge during the course of the policy, programme
or project lifecycle. Its purpose is to support better decision-making
through understanding the risks inherent in a proposal and their
likely impact.
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Effective
risk management helps the achievement of wider aims, such as: effective
change management; the efficient use of resources; better project
management; minimising waste and fraud; and supporting innovation.
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Organisation level risk management
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Public
sector organisations should foster a pragmatic approach to risk
management at all levels.1
This involves:
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Establishing
a risk management framework, within which risks are identified
and managed; |
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Senior
management support, ownership and leadership of risk management
policies; |
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Clear
communication of organisational risk management policies to
all staff; and |
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Fully
embedding risk management into business processes and ensuring
it applies consistently. |
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These actions should help establish an organisational culture that
supports well thought out risk taking and innovation.
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Policy,
programme and project level risk management
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At
the level of individual policies, programmes and policies, risk
management strategies should be adopted in a way that is appropriate
to their scale.
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A
risk register or risk log is a useful
tool to identify, quantify and value the extent of risk and uncertainty
relating to a proposal. A risk register / log can be used to identify
the bearer of each risk and uncertainty associated with the project
being appraised, provide an assessment of the likelihood of each
risk occurring, and estimate its impact on project outcomes. Box
4.1 provides more detail.
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BOX
4.1: RISK REGISTER (RISK LOG)
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Risk Mitigation
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There
are a number of approaches appraisers might take to mitigate the
impact of the identified risks. These are outlined in Box 4.2.
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BOX
4.2 OPTIONS TO HELP MANAGE RISK
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Active
risk management – Effective management of
risks involves: |
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identifying
possible risks in advance and putting mechanisms in place
to minimise the likelihood of their materialising with adverse
effects; |
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having
processes in place to monitor risks, and access to reliable,
up-to-date information about risks; |
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the
right balance of control in place to mitigate the adverse
consequences of the risks, if they should materialise; and |
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decision-making
processes supported by a framework of risk analysis and
evaluation. |
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Early
consultation – Experience suggests that costs
tend to increase as more requirements are identified. Early
consultation will help to identify what those needs are
and how they may be addressed. |
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Avoidance
of irreversible decisions
– Where lead options involve irreversibility, a full
assessment of costs should include the possibility of delay,
allowing more time for investigation of alternative ways
to achieve the objectives. |
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Pilot
Studies – Acquiring
more information about risks affecting a project through
pilots allows steps to be taken to mitigate either the adverse
consequences of bad outcomes, or increase the benefits of
good outcomes. |
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Design
Flexibility – Where
future demand and relative prices are uncertain, it may
be worth choosing a flexible design adaptable to future
changes, rather than a design suited to only one particular
outcome. For example, different types of fuel can be used
to fire a dual fired boiler, depending on future relative
prices of alternative fuels. Breaking a project into stages,
with successive review points at which the project could
be stopped or changed, can also increase flexibility. |
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Precautionary
Principle
– Precautionary action can be taken to mitigate a
perceived risk. The precautionary principle states that because
some outcomes are so bad, even though they may be very unlikely,
precautionary action is justified. In cases where such risks
have been identified, they should be drawn to the attention
of senior management and expert advice sought. |
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Procurement/contractual
– risk can be contractually transferred to other parties
and maintained through good contractual relationships, both
formal and informal. Insurance is the most obvious example
of risk transfer. The main text of this annex provides further
information about the types of risk that can, and often
are, transferred. |
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Making
less use of leading edge technology – If
complex technology is involved, alternative, simpler methods
should also be considered, especially if these reduce risk
considerably whilst providing many of the benefits of the
option involving leading edge technology. |
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Reinstate,
or develop different options – Following
the risk analysis, the appraiser may want to reinstate or
options, or develop alternative ones that are either less
inherently risky or deal with the risks more efficiently. |
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Abandon
proposal – Finally, the proposal may be so
risky that, whatever option is considered, it has to be
abandoned. |
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By
reducing risks and uncertainty in these ways, the expected costs
of a proposal are lowered or the expected benefits increased.
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Additional
guidance on risk management can be obtained
from Risk Analysis and Management for Projects (RAMP),
the Office of Government Commerce (OGC), the National Audit Office
(NAO), HM Treasury, and the Cabinet Office.3
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TRANSFERRING RISK
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Box
4.3 describes the general types of risk a project manager is likely
to encounter.4
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Risk
assessment will inform an overall view of the viability of an option,
i.e. whether its risk-adjusted benefits exceed its risk-adjusted
costs, or whether (in the case of uncertainty) the costs of a possible
adverse outcome are so great that precautionary action needs to
be introduced to obtain a cost-effective solution.
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BOX
4.3: GENERAL TYPES OF RISK
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Availability
risk |
The
risk that the quantum of the service provided is less than
that required under a contract. |
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Business
risk |
The
risk that an organisation cannot meet its business imperatives. |
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Construction
risk |
The
risk that the construction of physical assets is not completed
on time, to budget and to specification. |
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Decant
risk |
The
risk arising in accommodation projects relating to the need
to decant staff/ clients from one site to another. |
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Demand
risk |
The
risk that demand for a service does not match the levels
planned, projected or assumed. As the demand for a service
may be partially controllable by the public body concerned,
the risk to the public sector may be less than that perceived
by the private sector. |
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Design
risk |
The
risk that design cannot deliver the services at the required
performance or quality standards. |
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Economic
risk |
Where
the project outcomes are sensitive to economic influences.
For example, where actual inflation differs from assumed
inflation rates. |
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Environment
risk |
Where
the nature of the project has a major impact on its adjacent
area and there is a strong likelihood of objection from
the general public. |
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Funding
risk |
Where
project delays or changes in scope occur as a result of
the availability of funding. |
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Legislative
risk |
The
risk that changes in legislation increase costs. This can
be sub-divided into general risks such as changes in corporate
tax rates and specific ones which may
affect a particular project. |
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Maintenance
risk |
The
risk that the costs of keeping the assets in good condition
vary from budget. |
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Occupancy
risk |
The
risk that a property will remain untenanted – a form
of demand risk. |
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Operational
risk |
The
risk that operating costs vary from budget, that performance
standards slip or that service cannot be provided. |
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Planning
risk |
The
risk that the implementation of a project fails to adhere
to the terms of planning permission or that detailed planning
cannot be obtained, or if obtained, can only be implemented
at costs greater than in the original budget. |
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Policy
risk |
The
risk of changes of policy direction not involving legislation. |
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Procurement
risk |
Where
a contractor is engaged, risk can arise from the contract
between the two parties, the capabilities of the contractor,
and when a dispute occurs. |
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Project
intelligence risk |
Where
the quality of initial project intelligence (eg preliminary
site investigation) is likely to impact on the likelihood
of unforeseen problems occurring. |
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Reputational Risk. |
The
risk that there, will be an undermining of customer/ media perception of the organisations ability to fulfil its business requirements e.g. adverse publicity concerning an operational problem. |
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Residual
Value risk |
The
risk relating to the uncertainty of the value of physical
assets at the end of the contract. |
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Technology
risk |
The
risk that changes in technology result in services being
provided using non-optimal technology. |
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Volume
risk |
The
risk that actual usage of the service varies from the level
forecast. |
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When
faced with significant risks, a public body should consider transferring
part or all of it to the private sector.
The governing principle is that risk should be allocated to whichever
party from the public or private sector is best placed to manage
it. The optimal allocation of risk, rather than maximising risk
transfer, is the objective, and is vital to ensuring that the best
solution is found. Accordingly, the degree to which risk is transferred
depends upon the specific proposal being appraised.
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Successful
negotiation of risk transfer requires
a clear understanding by the procuring authority of the risks presented
by a proposal, the broad impact that these risks may have on the
suppliers’ incentives and financing costs, and the limits
to risk transfer which might still be considered for value for money.
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Where
the private sector has clear ownership, responsibility and control,
it should be encouraged to take all of those risks it can manage
more effectively than the procuring authority. If the public body
seeks to reserve many of the responsibilities and controls that
go hand-in-hand with service delivery and yet still seek to transfer
significant risk, there is a danger that the private sector will
increase its prices.
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Appropriate
transfer of risk generates incentives for the private sector to
supply timely cost effective and more innovative solutions. As a
general rule, PFI schemes should transfer risks to the private sector
when the supplier is better able to influence the outcome than the
procuring authority. Risks to be considered include:
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Design
and construction risk: to cost and/ or time; |
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Technology
and obsolescence risks; |
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Commissioning
and operating risks, including maintenance; |
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Regulation
and similar risks (including taxation, planning permission); |
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Demand
(or volume/ usage) risks; |
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Residual
value risk; and |
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Project
financing risk. |
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A
risk allocation table can be a useful tool to identify the bearer
of each risk relevant to a proposal. An example of this is set out
in Box 4.4.
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BOX
4.4: EXAMPLE OF RISK ALLOCATION TABLE
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OPTIMISM
BIAS
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Optimism
bias is the demonstrated systematic tendency for appraisers to be
over-optimistic about key project parameters. It must be accounted
for explicitly in all appraisals, and can arise in relation to:
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Capital
costs; |
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Works
duration; |
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Operating
costs; and |
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Under
delivery of benefits. |
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Capital costs
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The
two main causes of optimism bias in estimates of capital costs are: |
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poor
definition of the scope and objectives of projects in the
business case, due to poor identification of stakeholder
requirements, resulting in the omission of costs during
project costing; and |
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poor
management of projects during implementation, so that schedules
are not adhered to and risks are not mitigated. |
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Appraisers should adjust for optimism bias in the estimates of capital
costs in the following way: |
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Estimate
the capital costs of each option; |
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Apply
adjustments to these estimates, based on the best available
empirical evidence relevant to the stage of the appraisal;
and |
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Subsequently,
reduce these adjustments according to the extent of confidence
in the capital costs' estimates, the extent of management
of generic risks, and the extent of work undertaken to identify
and mitigate project specific risks. |
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Departments or agencies may be able to provide the best empirical
evidence to support adjustments for optimism. Alternatively, and
if applicable, they may be taken from the Green Book homepage5,
which provides the recommended adjustments to be made at the outline
business case stage for buildings, civil engineering, equipment
and development, and outsourcing projects.
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If
no obvious empirical evidence is available, this may indicate that
the project is unique or unusual, in which case optimism bias is
likely to be high. In these cases, adjustments should be based on
the nearest equivalent project type, and adjusted up or down, depending
on how inherently risky the project is compared to its nearest equivalent
type.
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If
a department chooses to apply its own adjustments, these must be
prudent. Where possible, the cost estimates, and the adjustments
for optimism bias should be reviewed externally (using Gateway reviews
for large projects, or internal audit reviews of smaller projects). |
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Works
duration
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The
same approach should be taken with estimating the length of time
it will take to complete the capital works. In summary:
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Estimate
the time taken to complete the capital works; |
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Apply
adjustments to these estimates, based on the best available
empirical evidence relevant to the stage of the appraisal; |
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Subsequently,
reduce these adjustments according to the extent of confidence
in the capital costs estimates, the
extent of management of generic risks, and the extent of
work undertaken to identify and mitigate project specific
risks; and |
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The
estimates of works’ duration, and the adjustments
for optimism, should ideally be reviewed independently. |
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The application of optimism bias adjustments
to works’ duration should be reflected in a delay in the receipt
of benefits. This will be shown in the net present value calculations.
The appraisal period may need to be extended to reflect the expected
delay in benefits’ stream, but different periods should not usually
be set for different options.
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Operating
costs and benefits
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Analysis
should also be undertaken on potential benefits’ shortfalls
and increases in operating costs. If there is no evidence to support
adjustments to operating costs or benefits’ shortfalls, appraisers
should use sensitivity analysis. This should help to answer key
questions such as:
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By
how much can we allow benefits to fall short of expectations,
if the proposal is to remain worthwhile? How likely is this? |
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How
much can operating costs increase, if the proposal is to remain
worthwhile? How likely is this to happen? |
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What
will be the impact on benefits if operating costs are constrained? |
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Preventing optimism bias
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To
minimise the level of optimism bias in appraisal, best practice6
suggests that the following actions should be taken:
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Project
managers, suitably competent and experienced for the role,
should be identified; |
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Project
sponsor roles should be clearly defined; |
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Recognised
project management structures should be in place; |
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Performance
management systems should be set up; and |
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For
large or complex projects: |
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Simpler
alternatives should be developed wherever possible; |
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Consideration
should be given to breaking down large, ambitious projects
into smaller ones with more easily defined and achievable
goals; and |
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Knowledge
transfer processes should be set up, so that changes in individual
personnel do not disrupt the smooth implementation of a project. |
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MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS
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Monte
Carlo analysis allows an assessment of the consequences of simultaneous
uncertainty about key inputs, and can take account of correlations
between these inputs. It involves replacing single entries with
probability distributions of possible values for key inputs. Typically,
the choice of probabilistic inputs will be based on prior sensitivity
testing. The calculation is then repeated a large number of times
randomly (using a computer program) to combine different input values
selected from the probability distributions specified. The results
consist of a set of probability distributions showing how uncertainties
in key inputs might impact on key outcomes.
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Box
4.5 provides an example illustrating the use of Monte Carlo analysis.7
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BOX 4.5: ALLOWING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN AN ANALYSIS OF
COSTS |
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The
table below gives the costs of various parts of a construction
project, broken down into excavation (E), foundations (F),
structure (S), roofing (R), and decorations (D). All costs
are independent of each other. The model for total cost is
as follows: |
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Total
cost = E + F + S + R + D |
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| Costs
for construction project (£) |
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Minimum |
Best
Guess |
Maximum |
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| Excavation
(E) |
30,500 |
33,200 |
37,800 |
| Foundations
(F) |
23,500 |
27,200 |
31,100 |
| Structure
(S) |
172,000 |
178,000 |
189,000 |
| Roofing
(R) |
56,200 |
58,500 |
63,700 |
| Decoration
(D) |
29,600 |
37,200 |
43,600 |
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From
this information we can produce a best guess of £334,100
for the total cost of the project. However, we can also conclude
a possible range from £311,800 to £365,200. Suppose
the project would not go ahead unless the total cost is unlikely
to exceed £350,000; how much assurance can we take from
these figures that the total cost will be less than £350,000?
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By
undertaking a Monte Carlo analysis, we can simulate many possible
values of the input variables, weighted so that the ‘best
guess’ value is more likely than the extreme values.
The total cost is calculated for each simulation, giving a
distribution of values for total cost. The precise weighting
depends on the probability distributions specified for each
variable.
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Using
triangular distributions, it can be concluded that the most
likely total cost is £334,000; and that the chance of
total cost exceeding £350,000 is less than 1%. |
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IRREVERSIBLE RISK
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Irreversibility
occurs where implementation of a proposal might rule out later investment
opportunities or alternative uses of resources. Examples of irreversibility
are destruction of natural environments or historic buildings. It
is particularly important to make a full assessment of the costs
of any irreversible damage that may arise from a proposal.
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Irreversibility
is often associated with facilities on which people place ‘option
values’ (the value of knowing a
facility is available to enjoy, if they wish to do so). This is
also linked to ‘existence values’
(the value of knowing that something continues to exist, even if
the respondent does not expect to make any practical use of it).
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Where
lead options involve irreversible damage, assessment should include
the consideration of options which involve delay, allowing more
time for investigation of alternative less damaging ways to achieve
stated objectives. Appraisal of different proposals should not ignore
the ‘option’ value of avoiding or delaying irreversible
actions, and the benefits of ensuring flexibility to respond to
future changed conditions.
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THE COST OF VARIABILITY IN OUTCOMES
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In
estimating the future costs and benefits associated with particular
proposals, there will inevitably be variation between these estimates
and the actual costs and benefits realised. This will be over and
above the impact of optimism bias, and will be as a result of random
factors unforeseen at the time of appraisal.
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For
the public sector as a whole, such random factors will tend to cancel
out, taking all proposals together. But in some cases, this would
not be expected to happen. Some projects - for example transport
use - will tend to have appraisal risks that are systematically
related to the overall performance of the economy. Because the majority
or all of such projects will be affected by this same factor, appraisal
errors will not cancel out between projects.
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A
decision-maker who is risk averse cares about this potential variability
in outcomes, and is willing to pay a sum in exchange for certainty
(or willing to put up with variability on receipt of compensation).
This compensation is the cost of variability, and should be included
in appraisal when it is considered appropriate.
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Generally, a variability adjustment may be required when:
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Risks
are large relative to the income of the section of the population
that must bear them (including very large risks borne by
the whole population); or |
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When
risk is correlated systematically with income or GDP, and
so cannot be diluted by spreading across the economy. |
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The fraction of income worth paying for certainty (C) is approximated
by the expression:
C
= - var(y) / 2y*
where y is the net additional income resulting
from the proposal, and y* is the total expected
income or benefits (including the project income) of those impacted
by the proposal.
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Given
the size of national income relative to the scale of most individual
projects, the cost of variability for projects that benefit the
community as a whole is usually negligible.
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| 1 |
On
the 20 Novemeber 2002, the government (Strategy Unit) published
new proposals to help improve risk management in the public
sector. See the Cabinet Office website for further details
(http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/) |
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Reference
can be made to RAMP (http://www.ramprisk.com/),
or the OGC (http://www.ogc.gov.uk/)
for a range of materials including ‘Managing a Successful
Programme’, HM Treasury: Management of Risk: A Strategic
Overview (The ‘Orange Book’), NAO: Supporting Innovation:
Managing Risk in Government Departments. Also available are:
Management of Risk: A Practitioner’s Guide, published
through the Stationery Office, and the Risk Portal found on
the Cabinet Office website (http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/) |
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This
example was adapted from ‘Measuring costs and benefits
– a guide on cost benefit and cost effectiveness analysis’,
National Audit Office (NAO) and Vose, D (1996) |
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