| DISCOUNT
RATE |
ANNEX
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INTRODUCTION |
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This
Annex shows how the discount rate of 3.5 per cent real is derived
and the circumstances in which it should be applied.
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SOCIAL
TIME PREFERENCE RATE
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Social
Time Preference is defined as the value society attaches to present,
as opposed to future, consumption. The Social Time Preference Rate
(STPR) is a rate used for discounting future benefits and costs,
and is based on comparisons of utility across different points in
time or different generations. This guidance recommends that the
STPR be used as the standard real discount rate.
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The
STPR has two components:
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The
rate at which individuals discount future consumption over
present consumption, on the assumption that no change in per
capita consumption is expected, represented
by ;
and, |
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An
additional element, if per capita consumption is expected
to grow over time, reflecting the fact that these circumstances
imply future consumption will be plentiful relative to the
current position and thus have lower marginal utility. This
effect is represented by the product of the annual growthin
per capita consumption (g) and the elasticity of marginal
utility of consumption ( )
with respect to utility.
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The STPR, represented by r, is the sum of these two components, i.e.
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Each
element of STPR is examined in turn below. |
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Estimates of
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This
comprises two elements: |
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Catastrophe
risk (L); and |
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Pure
time preference  |
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The first component, catastrophe risk, is the likelihood that there
will be some event so devastating that all returns from policies,
programmes or projects are eliminated, or at least radically and
unpredictably altered. Examples are technological advancements that
lead to premature obsolescence, or natural disasters, major wars
etc. The scale of this risk is, by its nature, hard to quantify.1
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The
second component, pure time preference, reflects individuals’
preference for consumption now, rather than later, with an unchanging
level of consumption per capita over time.2
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The
evidence suggests that these two components indicate a value for
of around 1.5 per cent a year for the near future.3
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Estimates
of 
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The
available evidence suggests the elasticity of the marginal utility
of consumption (µ) is around 1.4
This implies that a marginal increment in consumption to a generation
that has twice the consumption of the current generation will reduce
the utility by half.
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Estimates
of g
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Maddison (2001) shows growth per capita in the UK to be 2.1 per cent over
the period 1950 to 1998. Surveying the evidence, the Treasury paper Trend
Growth: Recent Developments and Prospects suggests a figure of 2.1 per cent
for output growth to be reasonable. The annual rate of g is therefore put at
2 per cent per year.5
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The
calculated STPR
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So
with g = 2 per cent,
= 1.5 per cent,
= 1.0, then from equation (1) the STPR to be used as the real
discount rate is |
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0.015
+1.0*0.02 = 3.5 per cent |
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LONG-TERM DISCOUNT RATES
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10 |
Where
the appraisal of a proposal depends materially upon the discounting
of effects in the very long term, the received view is that a lower
discount rate for the longer term (beyond 30 years) should be used.6
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11 |
The
main rationale for declining long-term discount rates results from
uncertainty about the future. This uncertainty can be shown to cause
declining discount rates over time.7
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12 |
In
light of this evidence, it is recommended that for costs and benefits
accruing more than 30 years into the future, appraisers use the
schedule of discount rates provided in Table 6.1 below.
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TABLE
6.1:THE DECLINING LONG TERM DISCOUNT RATE |
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| Period
of years |
0–30 |
31–75 |
76–125 |
126–200 |
201–300 |
301+ |
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| Discount
rate |
3.5% |
3.0% |
2.5% |
2.0% |
1.5% |
1.0% |
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EXCEPTIONS
TO THE DISCOUNT RATE SCHEDULE
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13 |
The
standard schedule of discount rates
may not be appropriate in the following circumstances.
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For
international development assistance projects,
a discount rate derived from estimates of the social time
preference rate appropriate
to the recipient economy should be used. |
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When
undertaking sensitivity analysis, the impact of changing
the precise value of the discount rate can be analysed in
the same way as for other parameters in the appraisal. The
rationale for undertaking sensitivity analysis on the discount
rate should be clearly explained. |
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DISCOUNT
FACTORS
Discount
Rates |
| Year |
1.0% |
2.0% |
3.0% |
3.5% |
4.0% |
5.0% |
6.0% |
7.0% |
8.0% |
9.0% |
10.0% |
| 0 |
1.0000 |
1.0000 |
1.0000 |
1.0000 |
1.0000 |
1.0000 |
1.0000 |
1.0000 |
1.0000 |
1.0000 |
1.0000 |
| 1 |
0.9901 |
0.9804 |
0.9709 |
0.9662 |
0.9615 |
0.9524 |
0.9434 |
0.9346 |
0.9259 |
0.9174 |
0.9091 |
| 2 |
0.9803 |
0.9612 |
0.9426 |
0.9335 |
0.9246 |
0.9070 |
0.8900 |
0.8734 |
0.8573 |
0.8417 |
0.8264 |
| 3 |
0.9706 |
0.9423 |
0.9151 |
0.9019 |
0.8890 |
0.8638 |
0.8396 |
0.8163 |
0.7938 |
0.7722 |
0.7513 |
| 4 |
0.9610 |
0.9238 |
0.8885 |
0.8714 |
0.8548 |
0.8227 |
0.7921 |
0.7629 |
0.7350 |
0.7084 |
0.6830 |
| 5 |
0.9515 |
0.9057 |
0.8626 |
0.8420 |
0.8219 |
0.7835 |
0.7473 |
0.7130 |
0.6806 |
0.6499 |
0.6209 |
| 6 |
0.9420 |
0.8880 |
0.8375 |
0.8135 |
0.7903 |
0.7462 |
0.7050 |
0.6663 |
0.6302 |
0.5963 |
0.5645 |
| 7 |
0.9327 |
0.8706 |
0.8131 |
0.7860 |
0.7599 |
0.7107 |
0.6651 |
0.6227 |
0.5835 |
0.5470 |
0.5132 |
| 8 |
0.9235 |
0.8535 |
0.7894 |
0.7594 |
0.7307 |
0.6768 |
0.6274 |
0.5820 |
0.5403 |
0.5019 |
0.4665 |
| 9 |
0.9143 |
0.8368 |
0.7664 |
0.7337 |
0.7026 |
0.6446 |
0.5919 |
0.5439 |
0.5002 |
0.4604 |
0.4241 |
| 10 |
0.9053 |
0.8203 |
0.7441 |
0.7089 |
0.6756 |
0.6139 |
0.5584 |
0.5083 |
0.4632 |
0.4224 |
0.3855 |
| 11 |
0.8963 |
0.8043 |
0.7224 |
0.6849 |
0.6496 |
0.5847 |
0.5268 |
0.4751 |
0.4289 |
0.3875 |
0.3505 |
| 12 |
0.8874 |
0.7885 |
0.7014 |
0.6618 |
0.6246 |
0.5568 |
0.4970 |
0.4440 |
0.3971 |
0.3555 |
0.3186 |
| 13 |
0.8787 |
0.7730 |
0.6810 |
0.6394 |
0.6006 |
0.5303 |
0.4688 |
0.4150 |
0.3677 |
0.3262 |
0.2897 |
| 14 |
0.8700 |
0.7579 |
0.6611 |
0.6178 |
0.5775 |
0.5051 |
0.4423 |
0.3878 |
0.3405 |
0.2992 |
0.2633 |
| 15 |
0.8613 |
0.7430 |
0.6419 |
0.5969 |
0.5553 |
0.4810 |
0.4173 |
0.3624 |
0.3152 |
0.2745 |
0.2394 |
| 16 |
0.8528 |
0.7284 |
0.6232 |
0.5767 |
0.5339 |
0.4581 |
0.3936 |
0.3387 |
0.2919 |
0.2519 |
0.2176 |
| 17 |
0.8444 |
0.7142 |
0.6050 |
0.5572 |
0.5134 |
0.4363 |
0.3714 |
0.3166 |
0.2703 |
0.2311 |
0.1978 |
| 18 |
0.8360 |
0.7002 |
0.5874 |
0.5384 |
0.4936 |
0.4155 |
0.3503 |
0.2959 |
0.2502 |
0.2120 |
0.1799 |
| 19 |
0.8277 |
0.6864 |
0.5703 |
0.5202 |
0.4746 |
0.3957 |
0.3305 |
0.2765 |
0.2317 |
0.1945 |
0.1635 |
| 20 |
0.8195 |
0.6730 |
0.5537 |
0.5026 |
0.4564 |
0.3769 |
0.3118 |
0.2584 |
0.2145 |
0.1784 |
0.1486 |
| 21 |
0.8114 |
0.6598 |
0.5375 |
0.4856 |
0.4388 |
0.3589 |
0.2942 |
0.2415 |
0.1987 |
0.1637 |
0.1351 |
| 22 |
0.8034 |
0.6468 |
0.5219 |
0.4692 |
0.4220 |
0.3418 |
0.2775 |
0.2257 |
0.1839 |
0.1502 |
0.1228 |
| 23 |
0.7954 |
0.6342 |
0.5067 |
0.4533 |
0.4057 |
0.3256 |
0.2618 |
0.2109 |
0.1703 |
0.1378 |
0.1117 |
| 24 |
0.7876 |
0.6217 |
0.4919 |
0.4380 |
0.3901 |
0.3101 |
0.2470 |
0.1971 |
0.1577 |
0.1264 |
0.1015 |
| 25 |
0.7798 |
0.6095 |
0.4776 |
0.4231 |
0.3751 |
0.2953 |
0.2330 |
0.1842 |
0.1460 |
0.1160 |
0.0923 |
| 26 |
0.7720 |
0.5976 |
0.4637 |
0.4088 |
0.3607 |
0.2812 |
0.2198 |
0.1722 |
0.1352 |
0.1064 |
0.0839 |
| 27 |
0.7644 |
0.5859 |
0.4502 |
0.3950 |
0.3468 |
0.2678 |
0.2074 |
0.1609 |
0.1252 |
0.0976 |
0.0763 |
| 28 |
0.7568 |
0.5744 |
0.4371 |
0.3817 |
0.3335 |
0.2551 |
0.1956 |
0.1504 |
0.1159 |
0.0895 |
0.0693 |
| 29 |
0.7493 |
0.5631 |
0.4243 |
0.3687 |
0.3207 |
0.2429 |
0.1846 |
0.1406 |
0.1073 |
0.0822 |
0.0630 |
| 30 |
0.7419 |
0.5521 |
0.4120 |
0.3563 |
0.3083 |
0.2314 |
0.1741 |
0.1314 |
0.0994 |
0.0754 |
0.0573 |
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LONG-TERM
DISCOUNT FACTORS
| Year |
Long
Term Discount Factor |
Year |
Long
Term Discount Factor |
| 0 |
1.0000 |
23 |
0.4533 |
| 1 |
0.9662 |
24 |
0.4380 |
| 2 |
0.9335 |
25 |
0.4231 |
| 3 |
0.9019 |
26 |
0.4088 |
| 4 |
0.8714 |
27 |
0.3950 |
| 5 |
0.8420 |
28 |
0.3817 |
| 6 |
0.8135 |
29 |
0.3687 |
| 7 |
0.7860 |
30 |
0.3563 |
| 8 |
0.7594 |
40 |
0.2651 |
| 9 |
0.7337 |
50 |
0.1973 |
| 10 |
0.7089 |
60 |
0.1468 |
| 11 |
0.6849 |
75 |
0.0942 |
| 12 |
0.6618 |
80 |
0.0833 |
| 13 |
0.6394 |
90 |
0.0651 |
| 14 |
0.6178 |
100 |
0.0508 |
| 15 |
0.5969 |
125 |
0.0274 |
| 16 |
0.5767 |
150 |
0.0167 |
| 17 |
0.5572 |
200 |
0.0062 |
| 18 |
0.5384 |
250 |
0.0029 |
| 19 |
0.5202 |
300 |
0.0014 |
| 20 |
0.5026 |
350 |
0.0009 |
| 21 |
0.4856 |
400 |
0.0005 |
| 22 |
0.4692 |
500 |
0.0002 |
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Newbery
(1992) estimates L as 1.0, Kula (1987) as 1.2, Pearce and
Ulph (1995) as 1.2, OXERA (2002) as 1.1 currently and 1 in
the near future. |
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Scott
(1977, 1989) estimates as
0.5. Other literature suggests it lies between 0.0 and 0.5.
However, if zero, this implies pure time preference does not
exist, which is not regarded as plausible. |
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Scott
(1977) derives a central estimate value of 1.5 from past long-term
returns received by savers in the UK. A later estimate in
Scott (1989), updated this estimate to 1.3. However, this
was based on United States, as well as UK, evidence. OXERA
(2002) estimates
to lie between 1.0 and 1.6. |
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Pearce
and Ulph (1995) estimate a range from 0.7 to 1.5 with 1.0
being considered defensible; Cowell and Gardiner (1999) estimate
as being just below or just above one; OXERA (2002) estimate
a range from 0.8 to 1.1. |
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OXERA (2002) |
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Weitzman
(1998, 2001) and Gollier (2002) |
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